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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent. : REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT 
v. : 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMSf : Case No. 870276 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The failure of the State to respond to the issue of the 
propriety of the roadblock constitutes a waiver or abandonment of 
that issue. This court must find that the roadblock violated 
both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A consent 
following an illegal detention is insufficient in and of itself 
to make evidence seized as a result of that detention admissible. 
Under both of those constitutional provisions courts are required 
to make a finding that any consent is sufficiently attenuated 
from an illegal detention to dissipate the taint from that 
detention. Any consent given in this case fails to meet this 
attenuation requirement. The search of the trunk of appellant's 
vehicle cannot be justified under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO RESPOND TO THE ISSUE OF 
THE PROPRIETY OF THE ROADBLOCK STOP OF APPELLANT'S 
VEHICLE REQUIRES THIS COURT TO FIND THAT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION DID OCCUR. 
Respondent chose not to brief the issue raised by 
appellant relative to the constitutionality of the roadblock stop 
of appellant's vehicle. Rather than addressing the issue, 
respondent asserts that the question of the detention is rendered 
moot by appellant's failure to raise the issue of the 
voluntariness of the consent search. However, as shown in Point 
II
 r infra, the voluntariness of the consent is only a threshold 
issue in determining the admissibility of evidence seized as a 
result of the unlawful detention. This court is further required 
to determine if the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal detention to vitiate the taint of that detention. 
Appellant did request in his opening brief that this court order 
the fruits of the roadblock stop suppressed. One of the fruits of 
that detention was the purported voluntary consent. 
For a court to reach the question of the fruits of an 
illegal detention there must first be a finding that there was an 
illegal detention. Respondent has made an affirmative decision 
not to brief that issue in this case. Generally, when an 
appellant fails to brief an issue, that particular issue is deemed 
- 3 -
to have been waived or abandoned. State v. McCall, 677 P.2d 920, 
139 Ariz. 147, cert, den. 467 U.S. 1220 (1984); State v. Puckett, 
634 P.2d 144, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, aff'd 640 P.2d 1198, 230 Kan. 
596 (1981). The respondent chose not to address to the roadblock 
issue or brief it in any manner. Consequently, the state has 
waived or abandoned any argument on that issue. Therefore, this 
court should find that the roadblock in question violated both 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Since the State has 
conceded the primary illegality of the detention, the next issue 
to determine is the admissibility of the fruits of that 
detention. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT ATTENUATION BETWEEN THE 
UNLAWFUL DETENTION AND ANY CONSENT TO VITIATE THE 
ILLEGALITY OF THE DETENTION. 
Respondent contends that because appellant did not raise 
the issue of the voluntariness of any consent to search the 
vehicle, the evidence discovered as a result of the search of 
appellant's vehicle is admissible. Appellant requested that the 
See Point II, infra. 
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fruits of the unlawful roadblock stop be suppressed. The 
analysis suggested by respondent is insufficient to protect the 
Fourth Amendment interests at issue. Likewise, an analysis that 
looks only to the voluntariness of the consent is insufficient to 
meet the requirements of Article If Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
A. 
The Fourth Amendment Requires A Finding 
Of Both A Voluntary Consent And An 
Attenuation Of That Consent From The 
Initial Illegal Stop. 
In support of the argument that a voluntary consent, in 
and of itself, vitiates the taint of a prior unlawful detention, 
respondent relies upon State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah App.) 
cert, granted P.2d (1989). That is, in fact, the holding 
in Arroyo. However, that holding is of questionable legal merit 
for several reasons. The first, and most obvious, is that the 
Supreme Court of Utah has granted certiorari to review that 
specific holding. Second, the court in Arroyo misinterpreted the 
rulings of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit which it used as authority for this conclusion. Third, 
2 
See: Opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 20, 38. 
3 
This court reached similar conclusions in State v. Sierray 754 
P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988); and State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d 457 (Ut. 
App. 1988). 
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the holding in Arroyo provides insufficient protection of Fourth 
Amendment interests. Finally, the ruling in Arroyo is 
inconsistent with the rulings of the majority of courts that have 
addressed this same issue. Consequently, this court should 
overrule its holding in the Sierra-Arroyo-Aquilar line of cases to 
the extent that it must also be shown that there is sufficient 
attenuation between the initial illegal stop and the purported 
consent to make the questioned evidence admissable. 
The authority for the holding in Sierra and Arroyo, 
relative to the consent issue, is the case of United States v. 
Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.) cert, den. 107 S.Ct. 315 (1986). 
4 That is a case that has been criticized by the commentators. The 
interpretation given to Carson in Sierra, Arroyo and Aquilar is 
overbroad in light of both the ruling in Carson and other rulings 
on this same issue from the Tenth Circuit. 
United States v. Carson, supra, involved a dove hunting 
violation. A deputy sheriff observed the defendant hunting. 
Without the defendant's knowledge, the sheriff inspected a large 
pail belonging to the defendant. The pail contained a number of 
dead doves. The trial court found that this search was illegal. 
The sheriff then left the area and contacted a state game 
LeFave, Search and Seizure, 2d ed. §8.2(d) (1990) pocket part), 
fn. 88.1; Note, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches 
and Tainted Fruit, 87 Columbia 842 (1987). 
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protection officer. The two returned some time later and 
requested to search the defendant's vehicle. The defendant 
consented to the search. The same pail was searched and it was 
found that the defendant had exceeded the hunting limit. He was 
charged and convicted of that offense. 
On appeal, the defendant in Carson claimed that the second 
search was the fruit of the first illegal search. The court 
rejected the defendant's argument and held that the consent given 
under the circumstances of that case made the evidence admissible. 
The court first considered Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)f and ruled that the Supreme Court had rejected a purely 
causal or "but for" analysis in applying the exclusionary rule. 
Rather, the Court required that two alternatives be considered in 
order to determine the admissibility of evidence seized subsequent 
to an illegal search. First, if the evidence was obtained by 
means that were free of police exploitation of the prior unlawful 
conduct, the evidence would be admissible. Second, if the 
evidence was obtained in a manner sufficiently distinguishable 
from the prior illegality so that the evidence was purged of the 
primary taint, the evidence would also be admissible. 
In the context of a claimed voluntary consent to search, 
the Tenth Circuit in Carson held that the "exploitation of the 
primary illegality" meant that the law enforcement agents would 
have used the fruits of the primary illegality to coerce the 
- 7 -
defendant into granting his consent. The court in Carson noted 
that normally the issue would be resolved by determining if the 
grant of consent was voluntary. However, the manner of the 
request to search may also render the consent involuntary. After 
discussing the standards used to determine if a consent to search 
was voluntary, the court described the two critical factors that 
supported its conclusion in that case. First, the defendant was 
not aware that the prior illegal search had even taken place. 
Second, there was no use of the illegal search to coerce the 
consent. It is important to note that Carson did not involve any 
claim of unlawful detention. When any consent is derived during 
an unlawful detention, the Tenth Circuit has reached a different 
result. 
In United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985), the court noted that the government bears a heavier burden 
to show voluntariness of a consent after an illegal stop than it 
would bear after a permissible stop. The court held that in the 
situation involving an illegal stop, the government must establish 
a break in the causal connection between the detention and the 
consent. Likewise, the evidence must show that the consent was 
sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. 
- ft -
The court in Recalde cited Brown v. Illinois. 442 U.S. 590 (1975) 
and Dunavav v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), in holding that 
three factors should be considered in determining if a consent was 
tainted by a prior illegal detention or search. Those factors 
are: the temporal proximity of the consent to the illegal arrest 
or detention; the presence of any intervening circumstances; and 
the purpose or flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court in 
Recalde found that the signing of the consent form took place 
during the illegal detention and shortly after the officers should 
have released the defendant. Consequently, the search occurred 
close in time to the Fourth Amendment violation. 
With respect to the presence of intervening circumstances, 
the Recalde court rejected the government's argument that reciting 
the Miranda warning to a detainee would purge the initial 
detention of illegality. The government also claimed that the 
written consent to search form, which stated that the signer could 
refuse to consent to the search, constituted an intervening 
circumstance. The court rejected that argument, noting that the 
evidence indicated the defendant could not read English, 
Furthermore, the officers detained the defendant in a small room 
without returning his driver's license or the ticket for the 
In Brown, the Court rejected the argument that a confession 
made after an illegal arrest was admissible because it was 
voluntary in the Fifth Amendment sense. 
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traffic violation that was the basis for the stop. The court 
concluded that the design and execution of the stop and arrest 
reflected that its primary purpose was investigatory in nature. 
It was obvious to the court that the officers had embarked on an 
expedition for evidence in the hope that something would turn up. 
Such circumstances made the violation particularly flagrant in 
nature. 
Subsequent to the decision in United States v. Carson, 
supra, the Tenth Circuit found that the stop of a vehicle for a 
seat belt violation by the driver violated the Fourth Amendment as 
it stop was a pretext, United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 
(10th Cir. 1988). The district court in that case had failed to 
make any findings with respect to the issue of the subsequent 
consent to search the vehicle. The case was remanded to the 
district court so that the proper findings could be made, on the 
issue of consent applying the factors discussed in Recalde, supra. 
In doing so, the court noted that there would be few cases 
involving an illegal detention where the taint could be vitiated 
by a voluntary consent. 
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the 
holdings in Sierra, Arroyo and Aauilar are based on a 
misinterpretation of the case law from the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. To be consistent with those cases this court must 
require that, in addition to finding a voluntary consent to 
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search, there must also be a finding that such consent was 
sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal detention to purge 
that illegality. This may be done by analyzing the three factors 
in Recalde, supra. These are the factors that the Supreme Court 
required to be analyzed in determining the admissibility of a 
voluntary confession after a Fourth Amendment violation in Brown 
v, Illinois, supra. Without employing such an analysis, the Utah 
rule is insufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests. 
In United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 
1980), the court required that these same three factors be 
employed to determine if the illegal detention has been vitiated 
by a subsequent voluntary consent. In discussing the necessity of 
such an analysis, the court related these factors to the policies 
that justify the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. These 
policies are deterrence of unlawful police activity and protection 
of the integrity of the judicial system. Mapp v, Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). The court in Perez-Esparza, supra, noted that the two 
factors relating to the temporal proximity and intervening 
circumstances between the unlawful detention and the voluntary 
consent relate to the deterrence policy of the exclusionary rule. 
The court further noted that an analysis of the purpose or 
flagrancy of the misconduct furthers the policy of protecting 
judicial integrity. 
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The result of the rulings in Sierra, Arroyo, and Aguilar 
vitiates these policies that underlie the Fourth Amendment's 
exclusionary rule. Law enforcement will be encouraged to violate 
the Fourth Amendment by making illegal stops or conducting illegal 
searches. To undo the initial illegality officers need only 
obtain a voluntary consent. The deterrence aspect of the 
exclusionary rule will be rendered ineffective. Furthermore, by 
limiting the analysis of such Fourth Amendment violations to a 
question of whether a consent was voluntarily given, the integrity 
of the judicial process is demeaned. Under the rulings in Sierra, 
Arroyo and Aguilar, courts are forced to condone the most flagrant 
and purposeful Fourth Amendment violations and address only the 
issue of the voluntariness of the consent. Furthermore, officers 
will be encouraged to perjure themselves, by testifying that there 
was voluntary consent. In order that evidence seized from an 
illegal stop may then be admissable. 
When there has been an unlawful detention followed by a 
voluntary consent, the Fourth Amendment requires the two part 
analysis previously described. The voluntariness of the consent 
is merely a threshold issue. An analysis of the attenuation of 
the taint from the initial detention is also required. A number 
This may already be occuring, as there seems to be a large 
number of cases decided by this court where a very questionable 
detention is followed by a voluntary consent. 
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of state courts and the majority of the federal circuit courts 
have employed such an analysis. Additionally, these courts 
require that the government bear the burden of showing both 
voluntary consent and the requisite attenuation. United States v. 
Guzman, supra. United State v. Perez-Esparza. supra. United States 
v. Bazinet. 462 F.2d 982 (8th Cir.) cert, den. 409 U.S. 1010 
(1972); United States v. Sanchez-Jarmillo. 637 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Cherry. 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Gooding. 695 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Miller. 821 F.2d 546 (11th Cir. 1987); State v. Rasheem. 
464 So.2d 293 (La. 1985); Reyes v. State, 741 S.W. 2d 414 (Tex. 
Cr. App. 1987); People v. Borges. 69 N.Y. 2nd 1031, 511 N.E. 2d 58 
(1987); People v. Odom 83 111. App. 3 d 1022, 404 N.E. 2d 997 
(1980). 
In analyzing the factors described in Brown v. Illinois. 
supra, a number of circumstances arise in the case law that are 
worth noting. With respect to the temporal proximity of the 
unlawful detention to the consent, the courts have generally held 
that when the consent is closely related in time to the detention, 
the taint of the detention remains. United States v. Delgadillo-
Velasauez, 856 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Miller. 
supra; United States v. Thompson. 712 F.2d 1356 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Recalde. supra; C.f. Juarez v. State 708 S.W. 2d 
772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). 
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Intervening circumstances have been found to include 
release from custody, an appearance before the magistrate, 
discussions with a lawyer, or a conviction on an unrelated charge, 
United States v. Delqadillo, Velasquez, supra. Other intervening 
circumstances that may establish sufficient attenuation between 
the unlawful detention and the voluntary consent have been 
described in the case law: giving of the Miranda warning and 
allowing the defendant to consult with a passenger, United States 
v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1983), Juarez v. State, supra, 
telling the defendant that he did not have to consent to the 
search, Reyes v, State, supra, developing probable cause from 
independent sources to justify the detention United States v, 
Cherry, supra, and whether the consent was volunteered or 
requested, People v. Borqes, supra. 
Circumstances relating to the purpose or flagrancy of the 
violation have included: the use of firearms to effect the 
arrest; People v. Odom, supra: a manner of arrest or detention 
that caused confusion, surprise or fright, United States v. 
Delqadillo-Velasquez, supra: a complete lack of suspicion or 
information about criminal activity by the defendant, United 
States v, Thompson, supra: State v. Zielman, 384 So. 2d 359 (La. 
1980); the circumstances of the detention reflect that officers 
were on an expedition to find evidence. Reyes v. State, supra; or 
the use of threats or physical force, United States v. Perez 
Esparza, supra. 
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In the instant case, the purported consent occured during 
the unlawful detention. There were no intervening circumstances 
between the detention and the consent. Finally, the actions of 
the officers were purposeful and flagrant in relation to the 
Fourth Amendment violation. 
Appellant was stopped on Interstate 15 at a roadblock. 
(Tr. 8) The lack of legal authority to engage in such a procedure 
7 
was discussed in appellant's opening brief. Likewise, troopers 
o 
had unlimited discretion in how the roadblock would be conducted. 
The fear and anxiety created by such a roadblock was also 
g 
discussed in Appellant's Opening Brief. 
After appellant was stopped, Trooper Howard requested that 
appellant produce his driver's license and vehicle registration. 
(Tr. 9) The registration indicated the vehicle belonged to 
appellant's wife (Tr. 9) and the driver's license was from 
Georgia. (Tr. 9) The trooper confronted appellant about these 
matters and also about the odor of alcohol that appellant had 
about him. (Tr. 10) The trooper then asked appellant if he was 
in possession of any alcohol, firearms or drugs. Appellant then 
Opening Brief of Appellant, Point I.A. pp. 11-14. 
Opening Brief of Appellant, Point II, pp. 21-38. 
Opening Brief of Appellant,Point II, pp. 21-38. 
See: 
See: 
See: 
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produced an open bottle of liquor, (Tr. 10) The trooper ordered 
appellant out of the vehicle and requested his consent to search 
the vehicle. (Tr. 11) Appellant acquiesced to that request. 
(Tr. 11) 
As can be seen, any consent given was inextricably 
intertwined with the unlawful detention. There was no substantial 
passage of time to allow appellant to reflect on whether or not he 
would grant his consent to search. There were no intervening 
circumstances that would eliminate the taint of the continuing 
detention. The stated purpose of the roadblock was to discover 
evidence of criminal violations. The procedures used did nothing 
to dissipate fear or confusion on the part of appellant. Finally, 
the questioning during the detention took on an accusatory nature. 
Appellant and the passenger were ordered out of the vehicle and 
appellant merely acquiesced to the request to search his vehicle. 
Any consent in this case was obtained as a result of the 
exploitation of the initial unlawful detention. The evidence 
seized is the fruit of that initial detention and must be ordered 
suppressed. 
B. 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FRUITS OF A VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION SHOULD FOCUS ON THE ATTENUATION 
FROM THE PRIOR ILLEGALITY RATHER THAN ON THE 
VOLUNTARINESS OF ANY CONSENT. 
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires that when an unlawful detention is followed by a 
purported voluntary consent, the government must not only show 
that the consent was voluntary, but also that there was sufficient 
attenuation between the consent and the detention to vitiate the 
taint of the unlawful detention. There is no question that a 
state constitution must provide at least the same scope of 
protection as the federal constitution. The state may, however, 
provide broader protections under its constitution than are 
required under the federal constitution. State v. Brooks, 638 
P.2d 537 (Ut. 1981). 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah should 
require that a finding of a voluntary consent alone is 
insufficient to vitiate the effect of an illegal detention. This 
court should, at least, require under Article I, Section 14 that 
any consent be sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful detention 
to vitiate the taint of that detention. In People v. Odom, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Illinois required that the three part 
analysis described in Brown v. Illinois, supra, be used in 
addressing the Illinois state constitution when a voluntary 
consent follows an unlawful detention . In People v. Borqes, 
supra, the New York Court of Appeals addressed this same issue 
See Point II.A., supra. 
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under the New York State constitution. In that case the court 
held that voluntariness of the consent is only one factor for the 
court to look at in determining if a search was tainted by an 
initial illegal detention. The court stated that consideration 
must be given to a variety of factors. Those factors include: 
the temporal proximity of the consent to the arrestf the presence 
or absence of intervening circumstances, whether the police 
purpose underlying the illegality was to obtain the consent or the 
fruits of the arrest, whether the consent was volunteered by the 
defendant or requested by the authorities, whether the defendant 
was made aware that he could decline the consent, and the purpose 
and flagrancy of the official misconduct. 
The factors that the New York court required to be 
considered in dealing with this issue provide stronger protections 
for privacy interests than does the rule in Brown v. Illinois, 
supra. Furthermore, the policy problems with the exclusionary 
rule are avoided by making voluntary consent only a factor to 
consider. It is an analysis that should be adopted by this court 
in addressing Article I, Section 14 violations. When the facts 
and circumstances of this case are weighed in light of the factors 
described in People v. Borqes, supra this will result in the same 
conclusion as was reached in Point II.A. The purported consent 
was closely related in time to the initial stop. There were no 
intervening circumstances between the detention and the consent. 
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The purpose of the roadblock was to obtain evidence of criminal 
violations. The consent was given after appellant was removed 
from his vehicle and after the officers requested to search the 
vehicle. 
The roadblock stop and detention of appellant violated 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. The seizure of 
the cocaine was not sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal 
detention so as to purge the taint of that detention. The 
evidence seized must be ordered suppressed. 
POINT III 
THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT 
REQUIREMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT 
JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK OF 
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. 
If this court finds that the search of the passenger 
compartment of appellant's vehicle was not the fruit of the 
initial detention, it must then determine if the warrantless 
search of the trunk was permissible. During the search of the 
vehicle, remnants of marijuana cigarettes were located in an 
ashtray in the rear seat area of the vehicle. (Tr. 13, 39, 51) 
When Trooper Mangelson began to search the trunk of appellant's 
vehicle, appellant told him to quit searching. (Tr. 41, 54) 
Mangelson responded that the discovery of the marijuana gave him 
probable cause to search the trunk. (Tr. 42, 60) At the time 
that the vehicle was stopped, appellant was in the driver's seat. 
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(Tr. 9) The only passenger, Dorsey Thompson, was in the front 
passenger seat. (Tr. 10) There were no occupants of the rear 
seat of the vehicle. The vehicle was registered to appellant's 
wife. (Tr. 9) 
Respondent relies on State v.Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Ut. 1986) 
and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S 798 (1982), to justify the 
search of the trunk pursuant to the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Earl, 
supra, the defendant was stopped for weaving. When the highway 
patrol trooper approached the vehicle he detected a strong odor of 
marijuana. The defendant admitted that there were marijuana 
cigarettes in a jacket in the passenger compartment. A search of 
the passenger compartment resulted in the discovery of cocaine, 
drug paraphernalia and air fresheners. The defendant was arrested 
and the car impounded. When the officers were unable to locate a 
judge to sign a warrant, an inventory search of the trunk was 
conducted and thirty-three pounds of marijuana were discovered. 
The court held that the initial search of the vehicle was proper 
under the automobile exception. The distinguishing factor in Earl 
is that the search of the trunk was justified as a inventory 
search. There was no claim that an inventory search was made in 
this case. 
In United States v. Ross, supra, police officers received 
information that the defendant was selling narcotics out of the 
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trunk of his vehicle. He was stopped. The trunk and several 
containers in the trunk were searched. In those containers 
officers located narcotics and currency. The court held that the 
containers in the trunk could be searched under the automobile 
exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. In this 
case, there was no information indicating that contraband would 
be located in the trunk. The question before this court is 
whether there was probable cause to justify the search of the 
trunk of the vehicle under the automobile exception. 
Some courts have held that when a driver or passenger are 
found in possession of controlled substances it is reasonable to 
assume that more controlled substances might be hidden in the 
trunk. In Osban v. State, 726 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986), 
drugs were located in the ashtray in the front seat and about 
three thousand dollars in currency was also found in that same 
area. In Fleming v. State, 502, So.2d 327 (Miss. 1987), the 
defendant's vehicle was stopped for speeding. There was an odor 
of marijuana in the vehicle. Four partially burned marijuana 
cigarettes were in the ashtray and seeds and marijuana were 
located in the defendant's lap. In United States v. Loucks, 806 
F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986), there was an odor of marijuana in the 
vehicle and some marijuana was found in the passenger compartment. 
The courts held in each of these cases that those circumstances 
justified a search of the trunk. 
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It is important to note that in all of these cases the 
controlled substances were in the immediate control of the driver 
or passenger, or the use of the substances in the vehicle was very 
recent. It could be reasonable under those circumstances to make 
the inference that there may be more controlled substances in the 
vehicle. In this case the remnants of the marijuana cigarettes 
were located in the rear seat ashtray. There were no occupants in 
that area of the car. There was no such contraband in the ashtray 
in the front seat of the vehicle. The clear inference that can be 
made is that the occupants were not in immediate possession of the 
drugs or had not recently used drugs. It is not reasonable to 
assume under these circumstances that there would be more 
contraband located in the trunk of the vehicle. Consequently, 
there was no probable cause to search the trunk of appellant's 
vehicle. The search of that area does not qualify under the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. The contraband that was seized as a result of that 
search must be ordered to be suppressed. 
POINT IV 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
UTAH PRECLUDES THE USE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION TO JUSTIFY THE SEARCH OF THE TRUNK 
OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE. 
In State v. Hyqh, 711 P.2d 264 (Ut. 1985), Justice 
Zimmerman wrote a concurring opinion taking the position that 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah should do away 
with all of the exceptions to the warrant requirement as 
established in the case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment. He 
took the position that the only exceptions to the warrant 
requirement of Article If Section 14 would relate to the 
protection of the safety of officers or to prevent the destruction 
of evidence or voluntary consent. In that opinion, Justice 
Zimmerman cited the breadth of the automobile exception as a 
reason to simplify the rule on warrantless searches. Under such 
an analysis, the search of the trunk of appellant's vehicle in 
this case would be prohibited under Article Ir Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
In Hyqh, Justice Zimmerman also urged the rejection of the 
exclusionary rule as the remedy for a violation of Article If 
Section 14. However, it does not appear that any other remedy has 
adequately furthered the two policies underlying the exclusionary 
rule: deterrence of police from committing constitutional 
violations and protection of the integrity of our judicial system. 
Consequently, the evidence seized as a result of the search of the 
trunk of appellant's vehicle must be ordered to be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The stop and continued detention of appellant violated 
both Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The taint of 
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the stop and detention was not vitiated to the extent that the 
fruits of the detention would be admissible as evidence against 
appellant. The evidence seized must be ordered suppressed. 
Appellant's judgment and conviction must be reversed. The case 
must be remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
DATED this day of February, 1990. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was MAILED/DELIVERED to the Attorney General's office, 
at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on 
this day of February, 1990. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB, COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
LOUIS SIMS, 
Defendant. 
******* 
Case Number, 151-D 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
• * • * * * • • 
This matter came before the Court on the 31st day of 
January, 1989 in Juab County, State of Utah, on the Motion of the 
Defendant to Suppress Evidence secured pursuant to the search of 
a vehicle he was driving when stopped at a road block in Juab 
County at approximately mile post 220. The State of Utah was 
represented by the Juab County Attorney, Donald Eyre, and the 
defendant by his counsel, G. Fred Metos. From the evidence 
presented the Court makes the following findings: 
1. Peace Officers representing the Juab County 
Sheriff's Office and the Utah Highway Patrol planned and executed 
a road block on July 27, 1988 al approximately 2 miles south of 
Nephi, on the north bound portion of Interstate 15. Prior notice 
of the road block was given through media publication to the 
effect that all motor vehicles except semi-trucks would be 
stopped for drivers licenses, vehicle registration, and 
mechanical checks, commencing at 7:00 a.m. Ten to twelve 
officers participated at the site of the blockade where proper 
advanced signing was given to approaching vehicles. 
Participating law enforcement officers were in uniform and with 
patrol cars present. 
Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol conducted 
a briefing prior to the road block of those participating wherein 
inquiry was first to be made of drivers licenses, and automobile 
registration, and that observations of the vehicles for equipment 
or alcohol violations including driving under the influence, and 
also for controlled substance violation. If no violations were 
apparent the vehicles were to be immediately released for 
continuation of travel. Citations or arrests were to be made for 
violations detected at the stop. 
The defendant, Louis E. Sims, vehicle was stopped at 
the road block at approximately 9:00 a.m. A trooper asked him 
for his registration and drivers license which were produced. 
The automobile was registered in Utah and the driver, Mr. Sims, 
had a Georgia drivers license. The officer delected a odor of 
alcohol, and observed an open container of alcohol in the rear of 
the car. The defendant denied the presence oT weapons or 
contraband, but admitted the presence of alcohol in the vehicle. 
Upon request of the officer consent was obtained for the search 
of the vehicle. Sergearnt Mangelson assisted the trooper, Carl 
Howard, in the search. In addition to the open container of 
alcohol the search of the backseat revealed two marijuana joints 
in the back right hand side ashtray. The defendant voluntarily 
opened the trunk and Howard conducted a field sobriety test of 
him. Mangelson search the trunk and after discovery of 
additional marijuana the defendant exhibited nervousness and 
asked the officer to stop the search. Mangelson continued the 
search and in the tire compartment found a one kilogram brick of 
cocaine. 
Arrest was made of the defendant for driving under the 
influence and for controlled substance violations. 
Based on the foregoing findings of the court the first 
issue to be resolved is whether the road block stop of the 
defendant was a reasonable seizure, and not in violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment Constitutional Rights. 
The only pertinent Utah authority in this area is the 
case of State of Utah v. Timothy Jo, case number 870537-CA, Utah 
Court of Appeals filed September 20, 1988. In that case a 
Sergeant Rudy Cook established a road block in San Juan County 
near Mexican Hat, approximately 100 feet from the entrance to the 
Navajo Indian Reservation in the early morning hours of March 29, 
1986. Cook received no prior authorizalion from the sheriff's 
office nor did he receive any call back after having called in 
the road block that the operation was not authorized and he 
therefore proceeded. 
The road block was so located that there was 
surrounding light from commercial buildings and a street light 
together with police vehicles parked on both sides of the highway 
with flashing red spot lights activated as vehicles approached, 
these lights could be seen for two tenths of a mile. There were 
two officers and a civilian assisting Sergeant Cook who advised 
those assisting him to "check everyone as they come for regular 
traffic inspection, proper registration, proper drivers license, 
check for intoxicated people, open containers." 
The Court of Appeals cited Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648 (1979), where the United Supreme Court held that a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution occurs when 
police detain a motorist to check drivers license and 
registration without..."articulable and reasonable suspicion the 
motorist is unlicensed, the automobile is not registered, or that 
the vehicle or occupant may be seized for a violation of law." 
In a dicta the Supreme Court stated that the above 
holding does not deter a state..."from developing methods for 
spot checks that involve Jess intrusion or that do not involve 
the unconstitutional exercise of discretion Questioning of all 
oncoming traffic at road block-type stops is one possible 
alternative." The Court thus limited the decision to..."only 
that persons in automobiles on public highways may not for that 
reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the 
unbridled discretion of police officers." 
The facts in Timothy Jo were uncontroverted that two 
vehicles immediately preceding the defendant were allowed to 
pass through the blockade without being detained, and therefore 
that such unbridled discretion was volative of the defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure. 
Since the Prouse case the Circuit Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia in the case of United States of America 
vs. Gregory McFadden, was presented the same issue as is before 
this Court. Citing the Prouse case for the concept that stopping 
an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments even 
though the stop is limited and resulting detention quite brief. 
The Court in McFadden emphasized that "such seizures are 
unconstitutional, however, only if they are unreasonable." The 
Court went on to say that "in determining the reasonableness of a 
seizure a Court must balance the gravity of the public concerns 
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances 
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with 
individual liberty." The Court went on to say that..."a seizure 
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that 
societies legitimate interests require the seizure of the 
particular individual or..."the seizure must be carried out 
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit neutral limitations on the 
conduct of individual officers," 
The Court in McFadden also cited United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, (1976), where the Supreme Court 
upheld the stopping of motor vehicles on a highway near Mexico 
for brief questions to determine whether illegal aliens were 
present. Noting that the check point where all vehicles were 
stopped was permanent and the degree of detention consistent with 
the Forth Amendment and did not require a warrant. The regular 
manner in which established check points are operated is visible 
evidence, reassuring to law abiding motorists that the stops are 
duly authorized and believed to serve the public interest. Other 
authorities were cited wherein automobile road blocks held in a 
clearly visible check point where all vehicles were inspected for 
legal aliens, drivers license, vehicle registration, and proof of 
insurance, where the road block was "established in a systematic 
manner to stop vehicles in a pattern which protected the public 
from the officers unbridled discretion,..."past constitutional 
muster." The Court pointing out that a single officer stopping a 
car along a road to check drivers licenses, and registration 
because of suspicious conduct of watching officers through the 
rear view mirror, that such a search was unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment. The Court stating that "a roving police stop 
is a more serious intrusion than a predicted check point 
inspection, because the unexpected stop is pregnant with great 
annoyance and inconvenience, and more likely to frighten or 
embarrass," 
In sustaining the road block imposed the McFadden case 
the Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized that the road block was 
to regulate vehicular traffic by allowing the check of drivers 
license and vehicle registrations. And that the side effect of 
deterring drug sellers trafficking in areas where the road block 
was posted did not render the blockade unlawful. 
The fact that a history of escalating drug traffic 
along this stretch of Interstate 15 as a result of other arrests, 
tends to legitimize the public interest in predetermined check 
points, systematically pursued by officers to minimize the burden 
to individual citizens without discretion to engage in random 
roving stops. 
The Court concludes that the road block in question in 
this case was so planned and so executed as to render the 
inconvenience to the traveling public to be minimal, and so 
structured to neutralize the officers conducting the road block 
to a minimal intrusion on the traveling public's time and 
inconvenience. 
As to the conduct of the police officers after having 
affected a lawful stop the Court concludes that it became readily 
apparent to the officers senses that the defendant had been 
drinking, and as a result of that and of sobriety tests given 
him, he was charged with driving under the influence. Also, the 
officer noted an open alcohol container in the vehicle and 
obtained the consent from the driver to search the backseat wher 
he found two marijuana roaches in the right rear cigarette tray, 
and asked the driver to open the trunk which he did. There is 
no evidence of coercion or duress to undermine the voluntary 
character of the consent given to the search of the car, 
including the trunk where marijuana was found. Thereafter the 
defendant withdrew his consent to continue the search, but the 
officer proceeded and found a kilo of cocaine in the spare tire 
well. The presence of the marijuana in the trunk compartment 
gave the officer reasonable cause to believe that additional 
contraband was probably present in the accessible areas of the 
trunk and which legitimized his search into the tire well where 
the cocaine was found. 
The Court concludes that all of the actions of the 
officers was legal and lawful and that the contraband obtained 
admissible evidence in prosecutions for controlled substance 
violations and other violations detected and charged and a resu 
of this stop. 
The Motion of the Defendant to Suppress the Evidence in 
this case is therefore denied. This matter is set for jury trial 
on the 28th day of March, 1989 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. in 
Nephi, Juab County, State of Utah. 
Dated this *- ^ day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE CJ BALLIF, JUDGE/ 
cc: counsel 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS, 
Defendant. 
******* 
Case Number 151-D 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
******** 
On or about the 24th day of February, 1989 this Court 
entered its ruling denying the motion of defendant to suppress 
evidence in this case claiming the same to have been secured as 
the result of an unlawful seizure of the defendant in violation 
of his constitutional rights. 
Defendant has moved the Court to reconsider its 
ruling..."for the reason that the Court failed to addressed the 
issue of the constitutionality of the stop oE defendant's vehicle 
pursuant to Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah." 
The Court has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the 
Tlefendant, and finds that it did not fail to consider the issue 
as to the broader protection afforded under the Utah Constitution 
to the personal rights protected by the Utah Constitution as 
opposed to Article 4 of the Federal. Constitution and the 
application of federal law in the area of search and seizure. 
The Court refers counsel to the findings made by the 
Court with reference to the road block, the m.it U-T in which it 
was constituted, the notice given the pubLLc as to its operation 
on a given day, the reasonableness of the detention provided and 
the limitation on discretion of an officer to pick and choose 
amongst the traveling public as to who would be stopped and who 
allowed to past. 
The Timothy Joe case is factually distinguishable from 
the case of the United State of America vs. McFadden, and 
although there seems to be no other Utah case than Timothy Joe 
which has addressed the road block issue, McFadden, would seem to 
be within the scope of police activity which would be found not 
to violate Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, and 
that the activities of the police in the case before the Court 
would be consistent with McFadden and found by the courts of this 
state not to constitute an unreasonable seizure of a defendant 
and incriminating evidence of a violation of law. 
The Court therefore again affirms its ruling as 
announced in the Ruling dated February 24, 1989 which denies the 
defendant's motion to suppress in this case. 
Dated this day of April, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
cc: Donald Eyre 
Fred Metos 
